Tax rule changes and the timing of asset write-offs in loss firms by Kohlhase, S. (Saskia) & Pierk, J. (Jochen)
Received: 31 August 2018 Revised: 9 July 2020 Accepted: 4 October 2020
DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12502
ART I C L E
Tax rule changes and the timing of asset write-offs
in loss firms
Saskia Kohlhase1 Jochen Pierk2
1 Rotterdam School ofManagement, Erasmus
University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The
Netherlands
2 Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus








This paper examines the asset write-off behavior of loss
firms in response to tax rule changes. In particular, we inves-
tigate two simultaneous changes in tax-loss carryforward
offsetting in opposite directions in Germany and France.
Understanding if and how tax losses affect firms’ financial
reporting is important because investors could receive a
biased signal of the firm value without such knowledge. We
hypothesize and find that following changes in tax-loss car-
ryforward offsetting rules, loss firms adjust their financial
reporting write-offs to avoid costly large book-tax differ-
ences. In particular, German loss firms reduce their finan-
cial reporting write-offs in the post-period by 0.61% of total
assets,whereasFrench loss firms increase theirwrite-offs by
0.15%of total assets as a response to changes in tax-loss off-
setting rules in opposite directions. We contribute to the lit-
erature by shedding light on the under-researched question
of how changes in tax rules affect the financial reporting of
loss firms.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Countries generally allow firms with negative taxable income in the current period to carry these losses forward to
the next period(s) or carry back to the previous period(s). The negative taxable income, referred to as tax loss or net
operating loss, lowers the taxable income of the period where it is offset. This reduces the tax burden in the respec-
tive period.While evidence suggests that following tax rate changes, firmswith tax-losses have incentives to shift book
income inter-temporarily (Guenther, 1994; Maydew, 1997), it is unclear whether and how changes in tax-loss offset-
ting rules affect financial reporting behavior.
With stricter offsetting rules, tax-losses may not be fully offset against positive taxable income, which directly
affects firms’ liquidity and also reduces the net present value of tax-loss carryforwards. For their tax accounting, firms
have the incentive to reduce large discretionary expenses (e.g., write-offs) in loss years and postpone those expenses
to profitable years when offsetting rules become stricter.1 For their financial reporting, firms face a choice between
adjusting their financial reporting to tax accounting or accepting differences between tax accounting and financial
reporting (book-tax differences). On the one hand, the cost of adjusting financial reporting to minimize book-tax dif-
ferences is that financial statements become less informative about economic performance.2 On the other hand, high
book-tax differences can be costly, because treating business transactions differently in tax accounting and finan-
cial reporting might make investors, auditors, and enforcement agencies suspicious about the quality of book earn-
ings (Erickson et al., 2004). Therefore, this paper investigates whether and by how much financial reporting write-
off behavior in firm-years with losses (hereafter: loss firms) changes in response to changes in tax-loss offsetting
rules.3
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) conclude in their overview article that we do not have a good understanding of how
tax-loss carryforwards affect financial reporting. Understanding if and how tax losses affect firms’ financial report-
ing in consolidated financial statements (hereafter, financial reporting) is important for investors and regulators for
mainly two reasons. First, if tax-loss offsetting rules affect financial reporting, investors will receive a biased sig-
nal of the firm value. To correctly evaluate the write-off behavior of loss firms, financial statement users need to
know when changes in the institutional environment affect the incentives to increase or decrease financial reporting
write-offs in specific situations. Thus, understanding the link between tax-loss carryforwards and financial report-
ing helps to assess the underlying economics of a firm. Second, the goal of the International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) is to achieve financial reporting comparability across countries (International Accounting Stan-
dard Board [IASB], 2018). However, tax-loss carryforward rules differ across countries and thus potentially influence
financial reporting differently. While some European countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary,
Poland, Portugal, and Slovakia) are strict and only allow losses being carried forward for five years or less, other
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Swe-
den, and the United Kingdom) allow losses being carried-forward indefinitely.4 Understanding how these differences
affect financial reporting behavior is important not only for standard setters but also for investors comparing com-
panies across countries, and for the compensation committee benchmarking their executives against international
peers.
1 We use the term “tax accounting” to refer to information provided to tax authorities and “financial reporting” to refer to public disclosure.
2 In theory, tax rules should not affect financial reporting in order to provide undistorted information to external stakeholders. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to testwhether changes in taxable incomeactually improveordeteriorate the signal fromwrite-offs. If, for example,managers opportunistically delayed
write-offs, tax incentives to write-off more could improve the information environment. Conversely, if the amount of write-offs reflected the underlying
economics correctly, tax incentives towrite-off moremight deteriorate the signal provided through financial reporting. Either way, tax rules are not designed
to alter the write-off behavior.
3 We focus on financial reporting write-offs for two reasons. First, write-offs occur often in loss years (Elliott & Shaw, 1988; Moore, 1973; Pourciau, 1993).
Thus, changes in financial reporting behavior in response to tax-loss offsetting are likely to manifest in write-offs. Second, the economic event causing a
write-off likely applies to financial reporting and tax accounting equally.
4 The remaining countries allow to carryforward losses between 7 and 17 years. Furthermore, some countries allow to carry-back losses for one year while
others do not allow carrybacks.We present country-specific details in Appendix B.
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In this paper, we compare the change in financial reportingwrite-off behavior in response to changes in tax-loss off-
setting rules in Germany and France, as both countries changed their offsetting rules in 2004 in opposite directions. In
Germany, where the 2004 reform has restricted tax-loss carryforward offsetting to 60% of taxable income, tax losses
have become costlier and firms have a stronger incentive to postpone write-offs to profitable years. In contrast, in
France, where the 2004 reform has extended tax-loss offsetting from five years to infinity, tax losses have become less
costly and firms have a lower incentive to postpone write-offs to profitable years. In a nutshell, tax losses become
costlier for German firms and less costly for French firms. If firms change the timing of the write-offs in their tax
accounts accordingly, but leave their financial reporting unchanged, the gap between book income and taxable income
will change.
We use two difference-in-differences analyses to examine firms’ financial reporting write-off behavior before and
after these two quasi-natural experiments of changes in tax-loss offsetting. First, we compare German loss firms with
French loss firms pre and post the regulation changes. Second, we compare German (French) firm-years with losses
with German (French) firm-years with profits (hereafter: profitable firms) pre and post the regulation changes. Since
Germany and France changed their offsetting rules in opposite directions in 2004, we can largely rule out alternative
explanations if the results on financial reporting write-off behavior go in the hypothesized direction in both countries.
Using data on publicly listed firms from Thomson Reuters’ Worldscope, I/B/E/S, supplemented with subsidiary infor-
mation from the Orbis database (Bureau van Dijk), we find that German loss firms reduce their financial reporting
write-offs in the post period by 0.61% of total assets, whereas French loss firms increase their write-offs by 0.15% of
total assets. These results are in line with our predictions.5
We are not aware of any other concurrent changes in the tax institutional environment of Germany and France.
Furthermore, both countries face the sameEuropean financial reporting environment and extensively tradewith each
other.6 As our research design consists of simultaneous difference-in-differences analyses with opposite predictions,
our results are not influenced by the 2005 introduction of the IFRS. To fully rule out concerns about the influence of
the IFRS introduction, we control for the introduction of IFRS in our research design and rerun our tests in a sample of
firms that did not have aGAAP change in our sample period.7 The results remain qualitatively unchanged across these
specifications. Thus, we are confident that no other concurrent macroeconomic factors affect our results.
Our results are robust to using various difference-in-differences designs, matching German and French loss firms
basedonobservable characteristics, using abalancedpanel, a Tobit regression insteadofOLS, and timehorizonsof one
(two, three) year(s) pre and post the 2004 regulation changes. Furthermore, we find the same results when focusing
on extreme values of write-offs in the form of earnings big baths (i.e., when firms write-off more than one percentage
of total assets). Furthermore, if write-offs were completely nondiscretionary, this would speak against our hypothesis
and empirical findings. Thus, based on prior literature and our empirical results, we are confident that the timing of
write-offs is at least partially at a managers’ discretion.
In additional analyses, we conduct cross-sectional tests along the lines of domestic versus foreign business opera-
tions and the importance of financial reporting earnings. Consistentwith the fact that tax-losses are tied to the uncon-
solidated tax accounts of the subsidiaries that incurred the loss, we find that firms with more foreign business oper-
ations are affected less than firms with predominantly domestic business operations. In addition, firms react less to
the 2004 tax rule changes when they have more analysts following. These firms care more about the informative-
ness of their financial statements and are thus less likely to alter financial reporting due to changes in tax accounting.
Overall, our results suggest that loss firms alter the timing of their asset write-offs following changes in offsetting
rules.
5 Changes in write-offs of 0.61% of total assets in Germany and 0.15% of total assets in France are economically meaningful. As a comparison, Szczesny and
Valentincic (2013) as well as Riedl ( 2004) document average write-offs of 2.8% of total assets for samples of German private and the United States listed
firms, respectively.
6 Between 2002 and 2005, around 10% of Germany’s total exports are being exported to France and around 15% of France’s total exports go to Germany
(Organization for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment [OECD], 2019).
7 Exceptions frommandatory adoption of IFRS are explained in Section 7.2.
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We contribute to the literature by shedding light on the under-researched question of how changes in tax-loss off-
setting affect financial reporting of loss firms. We show a specific mechanism of how financial reporting is adjusted
to tax accounting and do not rely on broad accrual-based earnings management estimations. Our findings are of
particular interest to countries that plan to change or already changed tax-loss offsetting rules.8 Our paper informs
policymakers and financial statement users about the financial reporting consequences of changes in tax-loss
offsetting.
Furthermore, we contribute to the financial reporting literature that investigates firms’ write-off and impairment
behavior. While prior literature is concerned with firm characteristics that influence write-offs and impairments (e.g.,
DeAngelo et al., 1994; Francis et al., 1996; Gietzmann & Wang 2019; Hazarika et al., 2012; Moore, 1973; Pourciau,
1993),weprovideevidence that the institutional environment is an importantdeterminantof firms’write-off behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the institutional setting. Section 3 introduces
related literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 4 presents the data and research design. Section 5 provides
the results, Section 6 contains cross-sectional tests, and Section 7 presents robustness tests and further results. The
conclusion follows in Section 8.
2 INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
2.1 Tax-loss offsetting
Germany and France are continental European countries that can be classified as code law systems (Szczesny &
Valentincic, 2013). Neither Germany nor France grants tax refunds in case of tax losses but tax losses are offset
with profits from either previous or future periods. Between 2002 and 2005, German firms with negative taxable
income could choose to carry tax losses backwards to offset it against profits from the previous year to amaximum of
€511,500.9 In the same period, French firms that incurred a negative taxable income could carry back the loss to the
preceding three years. If firms did not have sufficient profits in the previous year(s) to offset the tax loss fully, a tax-loss
carryforward is realized by the end of the fiscal year.10
In 2004, the rules to carry forward tax losses changed in Germany and France. Prior to the 2004 rule change, Ger-
man firms could carry forward tax-losses indefinitely without a limit. From 2004 onwards, German firms can offset
only 60% of the positive taxable income that exceeds €1 million against tax-loss carryforwards.11 The reason for the
change was that German firms had high amounts of tax-loss carryforwards (German Federal Government, 2003). In
line with the intention of the regulator, the average tax-loss offsetting decreased from €103,532 in 2001 to €79,956
in 2004, suggesting that limiting the tax-loss offset had tax consequences for German corporations (Statistisches
Bundesamt 2005, 2009).
Until 2003, French firms could offset their tax-losses against positive taxable income for five years following a tax
loss. Beginning with 2004, tax losses can be offset against positive taxable income indefinitely (EY, 2005).
8 For example, the United States Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) introduced stricter tax-loss offsetting. The TCJA was signed into law by President
Trump on December 22, 2017 and has entered into force for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017. Next to lowering the corporate income tax
to 21%, the TCJA has disallowed loss carrybacks, reduced loss carryforwards offsetting to 80% of the taxable income and extended the carryforward period
from 20 years to infinity.
9 Germany has extended the tax-loss carryback from €511,500 to €1million from 2015.
10 France has reduced the period to carryback tax losses from three years to one year from 2012.
11 Assume a firm has a tax loss of €10million in year zero and a profit of €10million in the following year. Prior to the rule change, the tax loss of €10million in
year zero would be carried forward and fully offset against the profit in year one. Thus, the taxable income is zero in year one and no taxes are paid in either
year. After the rule change, only €6.4 million could be offset in year one (€1million+ 0.6* €9million) and the remaining €3.6 million (taxable income after the
tax rule change) would be subject to taxation.
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2.2 Individual financial statements
In Germany and France, taxable income is tied to book income in individual financial statements. In Germany,
legal consequences, such as dividend distribution, tax payments, and payout restrictions, are linked to individual
(unconsolidated) financial statements of each legal entity (Fülbier et al., 2017). For individual financial statements,
firms are not allowed to adopt IFRS voluntarily. In France, the use of single financial statements is similar. Firms are not
allowed to apply IFRS for their individual financial statements. Furthermore, individual accounts have a close link to
tax considerations, whereas group accounts have no such link (Le Manh, 2017). Tax authorities in both countries use
the individual financial statements as the basis for determining the taxable income, plus orminus tax adjustments. The
most common adjustments are adding nondeductible business expenses, deducting tax-exempt income, and applying
different amortization and depreciation schedules for book income and taxable income.
2.3 Consolidation for tax purposes
Germany and France allow groups to opt to sum up profits and losses among domestic group members for tax pur-
poses. Germany requires a shareholding of more than 50% in a German subsidiary and a contractual profit transfer
agreement to sum up losses at the level of a parent company (§ 14 German Corporate Income Tax Act; Körperschaft-
steuergesetz). The parent company files a tax return for the net taxable income of all companies included in the profit
and loss transfer regime. France requires a shareholding of at least 95% in a French subsidiary to sum up losses at
the level of a parent company. Similarly, a French parent company files a consolidated tax return for all consolidated
subsidiaries (EY, 2005).
2.4 Consolidated financial statements
Consolidated financial statements provide information for various stakeholders and are not formally aligned with
tax accounts in either country. The so-called International Accounting Standards (IAS) regulation (EU Regulation
1606/2002, EuropeanParliament, 2002) requires publicly listed firms inEUregulatedmarkets toprepare their consol-
idated financial statements in accordancewith IFRS since 2005. For firms that are not listed in a regulatedmarket (e.g.,
private firms), both countries allow firms to choose between local GAAP and IFRS for consolidated accounts (André,
2017).12
3 RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Some studies find that the impact of tax rules on financial reporting behavior is predominantly prevalent in private
firms (e.g., Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Beatty & Harris, 1999; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Cloyd et al., 1996; Coppens &
Peek, 2005). For example, Kosi and Valentincic (2013) study a panel of Slovenian private firms, where, as of 2005, asset
write-offs areno longer tax-deductible expenses. Theauthors findwrite-offs tobepositively associatedwith firmprof-
itabilitywhenwrite-offs are tax-deductible, and less associatedwhenwrite-offs arenot tax-deductible. A similar result
is provided by Garrod et al. (2008), who find that larger and more profitable private firms are more likely to write off.
However, the magnitude of write-offs decreases with size. Similarly, German private firms write-off more if they are
more profitable, havemore financial debt, and payout dividends (Szczesny & Valentincic, 2013).
12 André (2017) provides an overview of which EU country permits or prohibits private firms to use IFRS in consolidated and unconsolidated financial state-
ments.
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If tax rules provide incentives to alter tax accounting, as in the case of changed offsetting rules, firms have a choice
to adjust their financial reporting accordingly or to not react in their financial reporting. Differences between tax
accounting and financial reportingmay be perceived as a red-flag for low-quality earnings by investors (Erickson et al.,
2004; Hanlon, 2005). Thus, it is not obvious that firms adjust their consolidated financial statements in response to
changes in tax-loss offsetting. While aligning financial reporting with tax accounting avoids the costs associated with
high book-tax differences, it alters the information provided by financial reporting. This is documented by Guenther
et al. (1997), who find that the incentive to defer income for tax purposes causes firms to also defer income for finan-
cial reporting purposes due to the higher book-tax conformity introduced by the 1986 Tax Reform Act. The higher
book-tax conformity, however, has a negative impact on firms’ earnings informativeness (Hanlon et al., 2008).
InGermany, the2004 tax rule changemade tax-loss offsetting stricter bydelaying tax-loss deductions. This is costly
for firms, as it increases taxable income and postpones tax savings to future periods. Thus, the 2004 tax rule change
reduces the present value of tax savings resulting from tax-loss deductions. It, therefore, incentivizes firms to reduce
large discretionary expenses (e.g., write-offs) in their tax accounting in loss years and postpone those expenses to prof-
itable years. As the 2004 reform limited tax-loss deductions for German firms, we expect German loss firms to write-
off less after 2004 in their financial reporting to reduce costly book-tax differences. We state our first hypothesis in
alternative form as follows.
Hypothesis 1. After the 2004 restriction in tax-loss offsetting, German loss firms report write-offs to a lesser extent
in their consolidated financial reporting.
In France, the 2004 tax rule change made tax-loss offsetting less strict. Extending the period to offset tax-losses
from five years to infinitymakes losses cheaper for French firms, as tax-losses do not forfeit any longer after five years.
In the period with time constraints on tax-loss offsetting, firms had the incentive to avoid large losses by recognizing
lower charges forwrite-offs if firms exhibited already losses. This suggests that the incentives of French firms to report
losses are not influencedby the rules to offset tax-losses anymore as of 2004.Hence,we formulate our secondhypoth-
esis in alternative form as follows.
Hypothesis 2. After the 2004 extension in tax-loss offsetting, French loss firms report larger write-offs in their con-
solidated financial reporting.
4 DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
4.1 Data
We use consolidated financial statement data of publicly listed German and French firms fromWorldscope by Thom-
son Reuters for the period 2002 to 2005, which includes two years before and after the offsetting rule change in Ger-
many andFrance. Starting our sample period before 2002 is less suitable, as therewas a tax systemchange inGermany
in2001. Thus,wedefine thepre-period from2002 to2003and thepost-period from2004 to2005.13 Ourmain sample
consists exclusively of firm-years with losses of German and French publicly listed firms. We observe 784 firm-years
with losses from Germany and 650 firm-years with losses from France. Given our analysis of write-off behavior, we
classify a firm-year as a loss firm-year if a firm realizes negative earnings before interest and taxes beforewrite-offs in
a given year. Observations with profitable years, that is, positive earnings before interest and taxes before write-offs,
are used as a control group in Equation 3.
13 We also test other time periods in the robustness section.
KOHLHASE AND PIERK 7
4.2 Research design
Our main identification strategy is based on comparing two simultaneous changes in tax-loss offsetting with oppo-
site expectations for Germany and France. We test German and French firms’ financial reporting behavior separately
pre and post the changes in tax-loss offsetting. Furthermore, we employ a difference-in-differences design where we
compare the financial reporting behavior of German firms against French firms pre and post the changes in tax-loss
offsetting. Both countries are neighbors, politically as well as economically highly connected, and face the same finan-
cial reporting environment. By explicitly comparing changes in both countries, we can rule out that macroeconomic
factors or specific accounting regulations influence the results of our analyses.14
We argue in Section 3 that the 2004 changes in offsetting ruleswill induceGerman loss firms towrite off to a lesser
extent and French loss firms to write-off to a larger extent. The dependent variable in our research design isWRITE-
OFF, which is the sumof all impairments reported inWorldscope deflated by lagged total assets. POST is coded one for
years after the tax rule changes and zero otherwise. We define a firm as a loss firm if it has negative earnings before
interest, tax, andwrite-offs. The regressions use robust standard errors clustered at the firm level and include industry
and year fixed effects when indicated.
In the first part of our analysis, we run regressions separately forGermany and France and are especially interested
in the parameter estimate for POST (β1).We expect β1 to have a negative coefficient for Germany, which indicates that
German loss firms impair assets to a lesser extent after the tax rule change. For France, we expect the opposite, that
is, a positive coefficient.
WRITEOFFi,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ POST + 𝛽2 ∗ SIZEi,t + 𝛽3 ∗ ROAi,t + 𝛽4 ∗ SD(ROA)i,t + 𝛽5 ∗ R&Di,t
+𝛽6 ∗ LEVi,t + 𝛽7 ∗ BIG4i,t + 𝛽8 ∗ IFRSi,t + 𝛽9 ∗WRITEOFFi,t−1 +
∑n
i=10 𝛽i ∗ FE + 𝜀i,t.
(1)
We include SIZEas a control variablebecausebigger firmsmight engage in largerwrite-offs and thewrite-off behav-
ior of bigger firmsmay bemore visible. SIZE is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets.We control for leverage
induced incentives by including LEV, which is defined as financial long- and short-term debt over lagged total assets
because firms that are close to violating debt covenants today or in the future might be more likely to shift profits
in time to reduce volatility (e.g., DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994). Poor performance might be linked to
impairments and write-offs. Thus, profitability (ROA), defined as EBIT corrected for write-offs and deflated by lagged
total assets, might influence write-off behavior of firms, as prior literature shows that managers shift earnings from
the future to the current period if firmperformance isweak (e.g., DeFond&Park, 1997). Because offsetting rules affect
firms’ risk-taking behavior (Langenmayr & Lester, 2018; Ljungqvist et al., 2017), we control for the country-industry-
year standard deviation of return on assets before write-offs to control for changes in firms’ risk-taking behavior at
the country-industry level. Loss firms show more write-offs and have higher research and development costs than
profitable firms (Bartov et al., 1998; Darrough & Ye, 2007; Joos & Plesko, 2005). Thus, we include R&D, defined as
R&D expenses deflated by lagged total assets. Write-off behavior might be correlated with the quality of the auditor.
Therefore, we include BIG4 as an indicator variable that takes the value of one, if a firm is audited by a Big4 company
and zero otherwise (DeAngelo, 1981). Furthermore, we control for the introduction of IFRS as a contemporaneous
event during our sample period.15 Lastly, we also control for the level of write-offs in the pre period (WRITEOFFt-1).16
14 For instance, Germany’s GDP per capita grew from € 28.8k to € 35.2k between 2002 and 2006 while France’s GDP per capita grew slightly less from €
28.2k to € 32.2k (OECD). We do not include GDP growth as a control variable in all our specifications, as GDP growth is highly correlated with the country
indicator variables and the indicator variable for the post period. Nevertheless, in untabulated results we find that our results remain qualitatively the same
if we include GDP growth as a control variable.
15 For coding the dummy variable IFRS we apply the classification by Daske et al. (2013, p. 538). Hence, IFRS is coded one if the firm is using the IAS, any kind
of IASC guidelines, or IFRS.
16 In unreported results, we additionally control for themarket-to-book ratio and find qualitatively similar results.
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Prior literature shows that firms engage more in write-offs in the year of a CEO turnover (Hazarika et al., 2012;
Moore, 1973; Pourciau, 1993). In our research design, we do not explicitly control for CEO turnovers as the required
data is not available. Please note, however, that our research design consists of simultaneous difference-in-differences
analyses with opposite predictions. If, for instance, we observedmore forced CEO turnovers in the post period due to
a macro-economic downturn, we would expect to find a higher frequency of write-offs and earnings baths. This could
confound the finding in France, where we expect write-offs to a larger extent, but as we expect fewer write-offs in
Germany, this would contradict the findings inGermany. Hence, if we find the expected effects in Germany and France
that go in opposite directions, we can be confident that neither CEO characteristics nor CEO turnovers are omitted
variables that drive our results.
In the second part of our analysis, we include all loss firm-years for Germany and France and test the difference
between French andGerman loss firms. Therefore, we include the variable FRANCE, which indicates if a firm is French.
We interact FRANCE with POST and expect to find a positive coefficient (β3), which would indicate that French loss
firms recognize write-offs to a larger extent in the post period compared to German firms.
WRITEOFFi,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ POST + 𝛽2 ∗ FRANCEi,t + 𝛽3 ∗ POST ∗ FRANCEi,t
+Controls + 𝜀i,t.
(2)
To rule out that limiting our sample to loss firms affects our results, we apply another difference-in-differences
design where profitable firms are used as control groups in each country, respectively. We include LOSS, which is an
indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a firm incurs a loss.We interact LOSSwith POST and expect to find a
negative coefficient (β3) in the German sample and a positive coefficient in the French sample.




Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for loss and profitable firms, separately for Germany and France. All nondichoto-
mous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% levels. The write-off variable is multiplied by 100 to increase the read-
ability of our results. On average, German (French) loss firms write-off 1.71% (0.15%) of their total assets, whereas
German (French) profitable firms write-off 0.61% (0.09%) of their total assets. This indicates that, on average, write-
offs are larger in Germany than in France. The distribution ofWRITEOFF is skewed and shows that most firms do not
have write-offs in a given year. Furthermore, the median value of WRITEOFF is zero across all Panels, which shows
that many firms do not have write-offs in a given year. We, therefore, repeat our analyses with, for example, a pro-
bit regression in Section 7 (Robustness tests and further results). Among German loss (profitable) firms 64% (73%) of
the financial statements are in accordance with IFRS, whereas among French loss (profitable) firms 28% (41%) of the
financial statements are in accordance with IFRS.17
Panel E of Table 1 shows mean comparisons for loss firms before and after the tax rule changes. In line with our
expectations, German loss firms decrease write-offs by 0.86% and French loss firms increase write-offs by 0.19% in
the post period. Both differences are statistically significant. One noticeable difference between the pre and post-
period is that firmsmore often use IFRS, both in Germany and in France. This is explained by the fact that the IFRSwas
introduced in the post period. We discuss the impact of IFRS on our results in detail in Section 7.2. While most of the
17 The difference in the fraction of financial reporting in accordancewith IFRS betweenGermany andFrancemay result from the fact thatGerman firmswere
allowed to adopt IFRS early. Starting in 2005, most firms in the sample are required by the European Commission to use IFRS for firm-years starting in 2005.
Exemptions from this rule are explained in Subsection 7.2.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12 KOHLHASE AND PIERK
F IGURE 1 Write-offs of firm-years with losses
Notes: This graph depicts the average write-offs of German and French firm-years with losses for the pre-period
(2002 and 2003) and the post-period (2004 and 2005)
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
control variables are not statistically different between the pre and post period, Panel E shows that German loss firms
are smaller and French loss firms havemore leverage in the post period.18
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix with Spearman correlations above and Pearson correlations below the main
diagonal forGerman andFrench loss firms. Correlation coefficients that are significant at the 1% level aremarkedwith
a star. In line with our hypotheses,WRITEOFF is negatively associated with POST for German loss firms (Panel A) and
positively for French loss firms (Panel B). Both correlations are statistically significant. Both panels furthermore show
that last year’s write-offs are positively correlated with current write-offs.
We run several difference-in-differences analyses, with Germany versus France being our main test. We validate
the parallel trend assumption in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 compares German loss firms with French loss firms and
Figure 2 compares loss firmswith profitable firms. German and French loss firms show the same time trend in the pre-
period before 2004, whereas German loss firms reduce the write-offs and French loss firms increase the write-offs
of as from 2004. Similarly, German (French) profitable and loss firms show the same trends in the pre-period before
2004, while their write-offs develop differently in the period as from 2004 (Figure 2). We formally test the parallel
trends assumption by regressingwrite-offs on indicator variables for each year and the interaction of these indicators
with LOSS. In line with the graphical evidence, unreported results show no statistical significance in the pre-period
(2003–2004), supporting the parallel trend assumption.
Table 3 reports regression results for German loss firms in Model 1, for French loss firms in Model 2, and German
as well as French loss firms in Model 3. In line with Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, the results indicate that German
18 To alleviate the concern that our results are driven by these differences, we entropy balance our sample to adjust for differences in the covariates’ distri-
butions of first and secondmoments and confirm our results (unreported).
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TABLE 3 Regression results – Firm-years with losses
Dep. Var. Germany France Germany and France
WRITEOFF Pr. Model 1 Pr. Model 2 Pr. Model 3
Constant 0.537 –1.882** 0.771
(1.761) (0.624) (1.117)






SIZE 0.157 0.071* 0.114*
(0.087) (0.031) (0.047)
ROA –1.566 –0.433 –1.022*
(0.981) (0.438) (0.571)
sd(ROA) –9.453 5.294* –4.528
(6.790) (2.500) (4.129)
RD –3.018* –0.627 –1.656
(1.598) (0.526) (0.923)
LEV −0.295 –0.089 –0.173
(0.490) (0.110) (0.277)
BIG4 0.390 0.056 0.183
(0.300) (0.069) (0.162)
IFRS 0.358 0.087 0.301
(0.261) (0.090) (0.163)
WRITEOFFt-1 0.139** 0.304** 0.158**
(0.044) (0.056) (0.043)
Year-FE No No Yes
Industry-FE Yes Yes Yes
N 784 650 1,434
R-squared 0.080 0.104 0.130
Notes: This table provides OLS regression results for firm-years with losses only. The plus or minus sign in brackets before
the coefficient indicates the prediction of our hypothesis. The dependent variableWRITEOFF is total write-offs as percentage
of lagged total assets. Refer to the Appendix for further variable definitions. Thus, we omit the indicator variable POST from
Model 3 to avoid perfect collinearity of the year fixed-effectswithPOST.POST is an indicator variable that takes on the valueof
one if a firm-year is from the post period, that is, 2004 and 2005. FRANCE is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if
a firm is located in France, and zero otherwise.WRITEOFF is write-offs as percentage of lagged total assets. SIZE is the natural
logarithm of total assets. ROA is earnings before interest, tax, and write-offs deflated by lagged total assets. sd(ROA) is the
standard deviation of ROA per industry (first digit of SIC code), country, year combination. R&D is research and development
expenses deflated by lagged total assets. LEV is debt deflated by lagged total assets.BIG4 is an indicator variable that takes the
value of one if a firm is audited by aBig4 company. IFRS is and indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm applies IAS.
All nondichotomous variables arewinsorized at the 1%and 99% levels. The regressions include industry and year fixed effects
when indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and presented in parentheses.
**,*indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
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F IGURE 2 Write-offs of firm-years with losses versus firm-years with profits
Notes: This graph depicts the average write-offs of (i) firm-years with losses and profits in Germany and (ii) firm-years
with losses and profits in France for the pre-period (2002 and 2003) and the post-period (2004 and 2005),
respectively
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
loss firms conductwrite-offs to a lesser extent after 2004 andFrench loss firms to a larger extent.On average, German
loss firms write off 0.61% of total assets less in the post period (Model 1), whereas French loss firms write off 0.15%
of total assets more in the post period (Model 2). When testing France against Germany (Model 3), French loss firms
write-off 1.03%of total assetsmore in thepost period.19 In addition, the coefficient of -1.798 forFRANCE suggests that
French loss firms generallywrite-off around1.8%of total assets less thanGerman loss firms. All results are statistically
significant.20
Our results areeconomicallymeaningful. Thedecrease inwrite-offs by0.61% implies thatGerman loss firms reduce
write-offs by 29.6% relative to the period while French firms more than triple their write-offs compared to the pre-
period. Szczesny andValentincic (2013) report averagewrite-offs of fixed and current assets of 2.8% forGerman small
andmedium-sized enterprises that engage inwrite-offs of current and fixed assets. Similarly, Riedl (2004) finds that in
the period from 1992 till 1998, 16.5% of US firms have write-offs. Among the firms that write off, the average write-
offs amount to 2.8% of total assets. In terms of control variables, SIZE and previous write-offs (WRITEOFFt-1) render
positive in allmodels, suggesting that larger loss-firmswrite offmore, on average, and that previouswrite-offs are cor-
related with current years’ write-off. The coefficients of ROA, that is, the pre-write-offs return on assets, are negative
19 In the third model, we use year fixed effects together with POST as an indicator variable for the post-period. Due to its perfect collinearity with the year
fixed effects, we do not report the variable POST.
20 In untabulated tests, wematch each French loss firm to one German loss firm based on all observable characteristics to test whether differences in funda-
mental operations between German and French loss firms influence our results. For each variable, we use a caliper width that corresponds to half a standard
deviation of the respective variable. For dichotomous variables, we require an exact match. t-tests confirm that French loss firms and German loss firms
are not statistically different after the matching algorithm. The results using the matched sample are statistically significant and the economic magnitude is
slightly greater.
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across all models and statistically significant in Model 3, indicating that higher profitability is negatively associated
with write-offs.
Theprevious results compareGerman loss firmswithFrench loss firms.As all cross-country studies, our study could
potentially suffer from omitted correlated variables. Therefore, the next tests investigate whether our results hold
whenwe use profitable firmswithinGermany andwithin France as control groups (Table 4).Model 1 shows the results
for POST*LOSS without any control variables or fixed effects. The results suggest that German loss firms statistically
significantly write off 0.75% of total assets less in the post-period than German profitable firms. Models 2 and 3 show
that the results are robust to including control variables and fixed-effects. The economic significance of the results of
Table 4 are in line with the results of Table 3: In the most stringent Model 3, we find that German loss firms write off
0.63%of total assets less in the post-period (Table 3: 0.61%). French loss firmswrite off 0.11%more in the post-period,
but the results are statistically insignificant across all models (Table 3: 0.15%, statistically significant at the 5% level).
Furthermore, the coefficients on LOSS in Model 1 toModel 3 suggest that in Germany loss-firms write off statistically
significantly more than profitable firms in our sample period.
To sum up, our results are in line with Hypotheses 1 and 2 that German (French) lossmaking firms write off less
(more) in the period after a tax rule change that makes lossesmore (less) costly. Hence, we provide empirical evidence
that firms respond in their financial reporting write-off behavior to changes in tax-loss offsetting rules.
6 CROSS-SECTIONAL RESULTS
6.1 Analyst following
A firm’s choice to adjust financial reporting in response to changes in tax accounting depends on the importance of
financial reporting. Firms that have (more) analysts following likely caremore about the informativeness of their finan-
cial statements and are also more likely to receive more attention by investors. In our sample, around 43% of our
observations have an analyst following. If we do not find any analyst following in the IBES database, we assume that
the firm has no analyst following.21 We expect that firms that care more about the informativeness of their financial
statements are less likely to alter financial reporting in response to changes in tax accounting.
Weuse thenumber of analysts following as a proxy for the importanceof firms’ financial reporting. Thus,we include
#ANALYSTS, which is the number of analysts following as reported in the I/B/E/S database. We expect that German
and French loss firms with more analysts following adjust their write-offs less, as firms with a higher analyst following
have a greater incentive to provide financial reports that are informative about economic performance. We expect
and find a positive (negative) coefficient for the interaction of POST*#ANALYSTS in Germany (France) in Table 5, which
indicates that those firms react less to the changes in offsetting rules. Both coefficients have the expected sign and are
statistically significant at the 10% level.
6.2 International business operations
Consolidated financial reporting is influenced by business operations of all subsidiaries belonging to the group. Some
of these subsidiaries may not be in the home jurisdiction of the parent and therefore not affected by the tax-loss
offsetting changes. If available, we use data from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database on the percentage of assets of
21 The average number of analysts following for firms with at least one analyst is 8.03. Including the number of analyst in our main analyses does not affect
our results.
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TABLE 4 Regression results: Profit versus loss firm-years
Dep. Var. Germany France
WRITEOFF Pr. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Pr. Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant 0.668** –0.224 1.027 0.044* –0.318** –0.724**
(0.070) (0.445) (0.574) (0.018) (0.097) (0.205)
POST –0.105 –0.266** 0.084** 0.074**
(0.081) (0.087) (0.029) (0.026)
LOSS 1.378** 1.474** 1.425** 0.022 0.047 0.047
(0.204) (0.229) (0.224) (0.036) (0.066) (0.065)
POST*LOSS (–) –0.752** –0.690** –0.626* (+) 0.107 0.093 0.105
(0.266) (0.261) (0.250) (0.092) (0.088) (0.087)
SIZE –0.010 0.002 0.021** 0.022**
(0.024) (0.026) (0.007) (0.007)
ROA 0.692 0.759 –0.027 –0.024
(0.491) (0.503) (0.176) (0.176)
sd(ROA) 3.970** –6.541* 0.224 2.491*
(1.696) (2.694) (0.543) (1.032)
RD –1.370 –1.021 –0.002 –0.051
(0.871) (0.881) (0.189) (0.194)
LEV 0.112 0.180 0.074 0.044
(0.247) (0.251) (0.090) (0.088)
BIG4 0.088 0.092 0.018 0.017
(0.115) (0.117) (0.022) (0.023)
IFRS 0.207 0.232** 0.089** 0.057*
(0.106) (0.108) (0.024) (0.025)
WRITEOFFt-1 0.150** 0.138*** 0.489** 0.486**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.093) (0.093)
Year-FE No No Yes No No Yes
Industry-FE No No Yes No No Yes
N 2,717 2,717 2,717 2,762 2,762 2,762
R-squared 0.046 0.073 0.089 0.008 0.145 0.155
Notes: This table provides OLS regression results for firm-years with profits and losses. The plus or minus sign in brackets
before the coefficient indicates the prediction of our hypothesis. The dependent variableWRITEOFF is total write-offs as per-
centage of lagged total assets. We omit the indicator variable POST from Model 3 and Model 6 to avoid perfect collinearity
of the year fixed-effects with POST. POST is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a firm-year is from the post
period, that is, 2004 and 2005. LOSS is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm has negative earnings before
interest, tax, and write-offs, and zero otherwise.WRITEOFF is write-offs as percentage of lagged total assets. SIZE is the natu-
ral logarithm of total assets. ROA is earnings before interest, tax, and write-offs deflated by lagged total assets. sd(ROA) is the
standard deviation of ROA per industry (first digit of SIC code), country, year combination. R&D is research and development
expenses deflated by lagged total assets. LEV is debt deflated by lagged total assets. BIG4 is an indicator variable that takes
the value of one if a firm is audited by a Big4 company. IFRS is and indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm applies
International Accounting Standards. All nondichotomous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The regressions
include industry and year fixed effects when indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and presented in paren-
theses.
**,* indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
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TABLE 5 Regression results: Cross-sectional analyses
Dep. Var. Germany France
WRITEOFF Pr. Model 1 Model 2 Pr. Model 3 Model 4
Constant 1.614 –0.904 –1.933* –1.746
(1.824) (1.993) (0.858) (0.896)
POST –0.869** –1.199* 0.222** 0.153
(0.262) (0.482) (0.082) (0.132)
#ANALYSTS 0.036 0.018
(0.034) (0.025)




POST*FOREIGN_ASSETS (+) 1.518*** (–) –0.122
(0.798) (0.484)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 784 364 650 275
R-squared 0.090 0.129 0.113 0.129
Notes: This table provides OLS regression results for firm-years with losses. The plus or minus sign in brackets before the
coefficient indicates the prediction of our hypothesis. The dependent variableWRITEOFF is total write-offs as percentage of
lagged total assets. First, we interact POST with #ANALYSTS, which is the number of analysts following. Second, we interact
POST with FOREIGN_ASSETS, an indicator variable for foreign business operations, to test whether the effect is less among
firms with large operations in foreign countries. Refer to the Appendix for further variable definitions. POST is an indicator
variable that takes on the value of one if a firm-year is from the post period, that is, 2004 and 2005. All nondichotomous
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The regressions include industry and year fixed effects when indicated.
Standard errors are presented in parentheses.
**,* indicate significance at 1% and 5% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
*** indicates significance at the 10% level (two-tailed).
subsidiaries located abroad.22 Wemerge these measures for the degree of foreign business operations with the con-
solidated financial statements of our German and French sample firms.
We interact the measure for foreign business operations (FOREIGN_ASSETS) with POST to test whether German
(French) firms that have larger foreign business operations adjust their write-offs after the change in tax-loss offset-
ting to a lesser extent. For Germany (France) we expect a positive (negative) coefficient on the interaction of FOR-
EIGN_ASSETS and POST. The coefficients for German and French loss firms show the expected signs, but only the
coefficient in the German sample is statistically significant. This corroborates our results as the effects of changes in
tax-loss offsetting on write-offs of loss firms are less pronounced for firms with more foreign business operations.
Table 5 reports the results.
22 As the ownership information is static in Orbis, we can only identify the subsidiaries based on ownership information from 2016 and data on the sub-
sidiaries themselves is only available as of 2006. The year 2006 is the last year of our sample period in robustness tests described in Section 7.3. For the year
2006, we aggregate the foreign total assets held by the subsidiaries of our German and French firms, respectively, and put this in relation to all total assets
held by the subsidiaries. Similarly, we put the number of domestic subsidiaries in relation to all subsidiaries for each German (French) firm. The untabulated
results are qualitatively the same.
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7 ROBUSTNESS TESTS AND FURTHER RESULTS
7.1 Alternative estimations
In Table 6,we use alternative estimations to corroborate our findings. Generally, a firm can decide to engage in awrite-
off and then determine the size of thewrite-off. Given these economic decisions associatedwithwrite-offs, our depen-
dent variable can be seen as censoredwithmanyobservations that are exactly zero. In Panel Aof Table 6,we show that
our results also holdwhen using a Tobit regression.We still find thatGerman loss-firmswrite-off less and French firms
write-off more in the post period.
Additionally, we show the results of logit regressions (decision to engage in a write-off) and OLS regression for
WRITEOFF>0 in Panels B andCof Table 6, respectively. In Panel B,we find the expected signs of the POST coefficients,
but only for France the coefficient is significant. Similarly, we find the expected signs in Panel C, but only the coefficient
for Germany is significant. We interpret this finding as follows: German firms are as likely to report a write-off in the
post-period as in the pre-period, but if they report awrite-off, they report less. French firms aremore likely to report a
write off in the post-period, but if they report a write-off, they report asmuch as in the pre-period. Taken together, the
results are in line with our hypotheses as, on average, German firms write-off less in the post period and French firms
write-off more.
7.2 International financial reporting standards
Apotential concern of this study is that our resultsmight be affected by the introduction of IFRS if German firmswere
allowed to adopt IFRS early, whereas French firms were not. However, our research design addresses this concern in
several ways. First, our research design consists of simultaneous difference-in-differences analyseswith opposite pre-
dictions. Thus, the introduction of IFRS is unlikely to affect the write-offs of loss firms in different directions. Second,
we include an indicator variable for IFRS in all ourwrite-offs regressions to control for the impact of the IFRS introduc-
tion. Third, we obtain confirming evidence also when holding the institutional environment constant in Table 4.While
studies of early adoption find no correlation between profitability and early adoption (e.g., Dumontier & Raffournier,
1998; Wu & Zhang, 2009), we nevertheless conduct our analyses within a subset of firms that did not change their
GAAP system during our investigation period. Hence, we avoid a potentially different impact of IFRS on German loss
and profitable firms.
There are three main reasons why firms did not have a GAAP change between 2002 and 2006. First, since 1998
German firms could choose between local GAAP and IAS for their consolidated financial statements.23 Thus, some
early adopters of IFRSdidnothaveaGAAPchangeduringour sampleperiod. Second, some firmswereallowed topost-
pone the IFRS introduction for twoyears (e.g., firms that are cross-listed in theUSand that prepared their consolidated
financial statements in accordance with US-GAAP). And third, firms listed on exchange-regulated stock exchanges
(e.g., the Entry Standard of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and the Alternext market in Paris or the New York Stock
Exchange) are not required to use IFRS and can still choosebetween localGAAPand IFRS (EuropeanParliament, 2002,
Article 4).24
In Table 6 Panel D, we repeat our analyses from Table 3 within the subsample of firms that did not have a GAAP
change. Our sample reduces to 509 (363) firm-year observations for Germany (France). The decrease in write-
offs in the post-period for German loss firms without a GAAP change amounts to 1.82% of total assets (Model 1),
while French firms increase their write-offs by 0.15% in the post-period (Model 2). The results also hold when we
23 This choice was introduced into section 292a of the German commercial code via the Facilitation of Capital Acquisition Act.
24 Pierk (2018) shows that less than 20% of IPO firms voluntarily adopt IFRS upon listing on exchange-regulatedmarkets.
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analyze differences in write-offs between France and Germany. In the sample without a GAAP change French loss
firms write-off 1.28% of total assets more in the post-period than German loss firms (Model 3). Whereas the coeffi-
cients of interest inModel 1 andModel 3 are statistically significant, the coefficient of POST is only close to significant
at conventional levels of statistical significance in Model 2 (p-value: 0.11), which can result from the lower statisti-
cal power due to the low number of observations. Overall, these results corroborate our findings and are in line with
Hypotheses 1 and 2.
7.3 Variation in the length of pre- and post-period and balanced panel
In untabulated results, we test whether our results are robust to changes in sample selection choice by repeat-
ing the analysis from Table 3 Model 3 with (i) a balanced panel of two years before and after the changes in tax-
loss offsetting to rule out that the sample composition affects our results, (ii) an unbalanced panel with only one
year before and after the changes, and (iii) an unbalanced panel of three years before and after the changes in tax-
loss offsetting. The results remain qualitatively the same in all three alternative specifications. The coefficient on
POST*FRANCE in the one-year unbalanced sample is smaller and shows less statistical significance than the coeffi-
cient in Table 3 Model 3, which can be attributed to the lower number of observations in this sample. The coefficient
on POST*FRANCE in the three years unbalanced sample is statistically significant at the 1% level, but economically
smaller than in Table 3Model 3, whichmay be attributed tomore contemporary events taking place during the longer
sample period (e.g., the German tax system changed from an ‘imputation system’ to a ‘classical corporate tax system’
in 200125).
7.4 Alternative classification: Big bath
The literature on financial accounting write-offs discusses the incidence of large write-offs, commonly referred to as
a “big bath”. Moore (1973) is one of the first who documents discretionary write-offs after management changes. The
evidence following this study unveils that firms that engage in discretionary write-offs, are larger, more highly lever-
aged, and have more often nonroutine CEO changes or nonoverconfident CEOs (Elliott & Shaw, 1988; Hazarika et al.,
2012; Pourciau, 1993). Similarly, Strong andMeyer (1987) provide evidence that the major determinant of write-offs
is management turnover. Furthermore, discretionary write-offs occur more often if managers are at the upper bound
of their bonus plans (Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995). Haggard et al. (2015) study whether the information envi-
ronment improves or becomes more opaque after large write-offs (i.e., earnings big bath) and find an improved infor-
mation environment following an earnings bath. In untabulated tests, we repeat all analyses with a logistic regression
design with BIGBATH as the dependent variable.26 In line with our predictions, German loss firms are 9.9% less likely
and French firms are 2.0%more likely to engage in an earnings bath after the 2004 tax rule changes. Testing German
loss firms versus French loss firms shows that French firms are 25.3% more likely to engage in an earnings bath after
the tax rule change than German firms.
25 A ‘classical corporate tax system’ is a system in which two different layers of taxes occur. First, corporate income taxes are levied at the level of the cor-
poration. Second, shareholders need to pay taxes on received dividends. Under an imputation system, the corporation pays the full taxes (corporate income
tax and a prepayment for shareholder level taxes) as long as the profits are not distributed. Upon profit distribution, the corporation receives a tax refund,
the shareholder needs to pay taxes on the received dividend and part of the taxes paid by the corporation are imputed (i.e., a tax credit is granted) at the
shareholder level.
26 Following Elliott and Shaw (1988), BIGBATH is equal to one if the respective firmwrites-off more than 1% of total assets.
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7.5 Alternative control group
To further rule out that neither institutional differences nor differences between loss and profitable firms drive
our results, we apply a third difference-in-differences design in which we compare German (French) loss firms with
Spanish loss firms. In untabulated results, we choose Spain as a control group, as Spain is the fifth-largest economy in
Europe and had neither changes in the corporate income tax rate nor in the tax-loss offsetting during our observation
period. Thus we include GERMANY and FRANCE as indicator variables that take on the value of one if a firm-year is
from Germany or France, respectively. We interact GERMANY and FRANCE with POST and expect to find a negative
coefficient for the interaction of Germany and Post and a positive coefficient for the interaction of France and Post.
In linewithour expectations (no change in tax-loss carryforward rules), untabulated results show that Spanish firms
haveno significant change inwrite-offs in the post period.When including thementioned interactions terms, the inter-
action ofGERMANY*POST and FRANCE*POST show the expected coefficients, that is, negative forGERMANY*POST and
positive for FRANCE*POST. The results are, however, only close to statistical significance.
8 CONCLUSION
This paper examines the relation between tax-loss offsetting rules and financial reporting behavior of loss firms. In
particular, we investigate a delay (i.e., restriction) in tax-loss offsetting in Germany and an extension in the period to
offset tax-losses in France. For German loss firms, tax losses became costlier as they are not allowed to fully offset
their tax-losses in the following profitable year. Conversely, the extension of tax-loss offsetting for French loss firms
from five years to infinitymade losses cheaper. In linewith the idea that firms have an incentive to avoid large book-tax
differences, we find that German (French) loss firms write off 0.61% of total assets less (0.15% of total assets more) in
response to the2004 tax rule changes.Wecontribute to the literature byproviding evidenceon the financial reporting
behavior of the under-researched group of loss firms. Our results suggest that restrictions (extensions) in tax-loss
offsetting incentivize managers to engage in fewer (more) financial reporting write-offs.
Knowing these interdependenciesbetween taxaccountingand financial reporting is important for investors in eval-
uating financial reporting signals about the underlying economics of the firm. Policymakers, tax legislators, and stan-
dard setters should be aware that tax-loss offsetting rules not only affect the tax payments of firms, but also consol-
idated financial reporting of loss firms. For example, changes in tax-loss offsetting in the United States introduced by
the TaxCuts and JobsAct 2017maybe an area for future research to testwhether our results forGermany andFrance
also hold in other jurisdictions. In particular, theUnited States, disallowed loss carrybacks, reduced loss carryforwards
offsetting to 80% of the taxable income, and extended the carryforward period from 20 years to infinity for taxable
years beginning after December 31, 2017.
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WRITEOFF Total write-offs as percentage of lagged total assets.
(wc18225+wc18274+wc18275)/wc02999t-1*100
Independent variables in write-off and big-bath regressions
#ANALYSTS Number of analysts following as reported in the I/B/E/S database.
BIG4 Indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm is audited by a Big4 company. Variable
is based onwc07800.
FOREIGN_ASSETS Assets held by foreign subsidiaries as percentage of assets held by all subsidiaries of a firm.
Data is retrieved from theOrbis database.
FRANCE Indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm is located in France, and zero
otherwise.
GERMANY Indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm-year fromGermany is observed, and
zero otherwise
IFRS Indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm applies IAS, any kind of IASC
guidelines, or IFRS, and zero otherwise (Daske et al., 2013) Variable is based onwc07536.
LEV Debt deflated by lagged total assets. wc03255/wc02999t-1.
LOSS Indicator variable that takes the value of one if a firm has negative earnings before interest,
tax, andwrite-offs, and zero otherwise.
POST R&D Indicator variable that takes on the value of one if a firm-year is from the post period, that is,
2004 and 2005.
Research and development expenses deflated by lagged total assets. wc01201/
wc02999t-1.
ROA Earnings before interest, tax, andwrite-offs deflated by lagged total assets. (wc18191+
wc18225+wc18274+wc18275)/wc02999t-1
sd(ROA) Standard deviation of ROA per industry (first digit of SIC code), country, year combination.
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets. ln(wc02999)
WRITEOFFt-1 Lag of total write-offs as percentage of lagged total assets. (wc18225t-1+wc18274
t-1+wc18275 t-1)/wc02999t-2
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APPENDIX B































The United Kingdom ∞ 1
Note: The table provides an overview of the 2018 rules on tax-loss carryforward and carrybackward for European coun-
tries.
aTaxes are only levied upon profit distributions of resident corporations.
bNot available in the EY corporate tax guides.
